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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________
Between 1929 and 1933, real output per adult fell over 30 percent and total factor productivity fell 18
percent. This productivity decrease is much larger than expected from just extrapolating the productivity
decrease that typically occurs during recessions. This paper evaluates what factors may have caused this
large decrease, including unmeasured factor utilization, changes in the composition of production, and in-
creasing returns. I find that these factors combined explain less than one-third of the 18 percent decrease,
and I conclude that the productivity decrease during the Great Depression remains a puzzle.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis or the Federal Reserve System.I now estimate the effect ofcompositional shifts by calculating aggregate TFP holding
sectoral productivity levels fixed at their respective 1929 levels, and changing labor inputs as
in the data. I use wage and empoyment data for all sectors from U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1975). I estimate that changes in the composition of production reduced aggregate TFP
by about 4.5 percent. Since this estimate is probably biased upwards, it seems unlikely that
compositional effects are bigger than Kendrick’s 2.5 percent correction.
This analysis suggests that Kendrick’s measure ofaggregate TFP adequately corrects
for compositional shifts, and that the sectors for which Kendrick does not report produc—
tivity - construction, finance/insurance/real estate, services, wholesale and retail trade, and
government - account for most of the 18 percent decrease in aggregate TFP. This residual
productivity decrease is likely due to lower productivity in the remaining sectors. The other
possible cause - a compositional shift from the highest-valued added to the lowest-value added
sectors within the residual category - is unlikely because wage differences are small in these
sectors. This suggests that accounting for the 18 percent aggregate productivity decrease re-
quires that productivity fell more than 25 percent, on average, in Kendrick’s residual sectors.
4. Alternative Explanations
Why did productivity fail so much in some sectors - manufacturing, railroads and in
the residual categories - but not in others? I now briefly consider two other explanations for
lower productivity: labor hoarding and increasing returns to scale. Bernanke and Parkinson
(1991) cite these factors as possible explanations for productivity decreases in manufacturing
industries during the Depression.
Economists oftenadvance labor hoardingasan explanation forlow productivity during
recessions. The standard labor hoarding thesis is that the firing and hiring costs associated
with temporary layoffs exceeds the cost of “hoarding” workers - reducing worker utilization
relative to paid hours. This utilization decrease reduces measured productivity.
The duration ofthe Depression, however, raises questions about the plausibility of the
labor hoarding explanation. It is difficult to reconcile the labor hoarding thesis - which is
based on the temporary nature of recessions - with a major depression that lasted well over
a decade. It seems unlikely that firms hoarded workers because they mistakenly expected
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